The book tracks the implications of the offensive through deconstructing complex ties that came into view during the offensive and the officials, public and intellectual positions which sought to explain the happenings.
The book concludes that most perceptions in the Israeli scene are unilateral; Neftali Bennet wants to annex areas “C” unilaterally, while Yair Lapid wants to define borders independently, and Lieberman wants a regional initiative superseding the President Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority. Only Netanyahu remains in power wanting to manage the conflicts again with the Palestinian Authority.
The book shows that the Netanyahu’s vision became clearer and clearer in the past years, as he wants to maintain the division and deal with Gaza under the power of a weak Hamas, or he wants to keep a Palestinian conflict over the control over Gaza between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority - PA. From Netanyahu’s perspective, it will not be a problem to create a concrete functional division in Gaza, based on the “PA on the periphery (the Crossings) Hamas in the middle (power in Gaza)” equation. This would guarantee for him maintaining the status quo with the least political and security damages for Israel, and this is why when Netanyahu announced he has no problem in the return of the PA to the Gaza, he meant its return within security arrangements on the Crossing, while he wants a weak Hamas in Gaza.
The book forecasts that Netanyahu would return to the starting point; the eve of the announcement of the Palestinian unity government, and try to take the word back with him to that point and start from there with a new variable: Holding the Palestinian Authority the direct responsibility for the Gaza Strip without a national unity government. This is why he mentioned that “the Palestinian president must chose between Hamas or Israel” after the war.
The book also clarifies that Netanyahu is weak when it comes to shifting tactical or immediate events to harmonize with his strategic perceptions. The war on Gaza started with the kidnapping of the 3 settlers, and Netanyahu wanted to exploit this event to return to the old pre Bar Illan- Netanyahu, but he got involved in the war, and looks for the suitable equation to exit with the least political losses, domestically and diplomatically. We believe that that equation is the PA at the periphery and Hamas in the Middle.
The book also shows that Netanyahu is moving within several lobby group circles, attempting to manage them in the same way he runs politics. His immediate circle, which is the Likud party that does not recognize Netanyahu’s conflict management policy in the first place, because the Likud refuses, till now, the idea of the establishment of the Palestinian state. It is a saying echoed by most ministers and members of Knesset. Then there is the right wing circle, and what it represents of social basis for Netanyahu, which is neither satisfied with the military nor political outcomes of the war on Gaza. The there is the regional circle, in which Netanyahu and his Defense and Foreign Ministers see a political horizon that may be used, and the international circles which now sees that the conflict is unbearable and that the solution lies in direct talks with President Abu Mazen and The Palestinian Authority.